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PERSONALITY CORRELATES OF STOCK 
MARKET SPECULATION
INTRODUCTION
The present research is the first known attempt to 
scientifically investigate the relationship between person­
ality characteristics and stock market speculation. All 
previous data concerning the personality dimensions of the 
successful investor falls within the anecdotal realm. There 
is a preponderance of "fundamentals" in the marketplace, but 
the area of emotions remains unexplored. All the charts, 
breadth indices, and technical palavar are the statistician's 
feeble attempt to describe the emotional state of the in­
vesting public. There is substantial work to be done in 
this realm, but so far no one has taken marketplace psy­
chology as an area worthy of intensive study. If the sta­
tistical area has been and is being so thoroughly explored, 
why shouldn't someone scientifically investigate this un­
explored emotional sphere (Smith, 1969)?
As very little "hard data" is available on the per­
sonality characteristics or emotional makeup of successful 
versus nonsuccessful investors, it may be helpful to look
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back at the Investing public's reactions to various erratic 
swings in stock market prices, since the "marketplace" is 
really a reflection of mass psychology (Engel, 1962; Smith, 
1 9 6 9). In early October of 1929, the greatest stock market 
crash in financial history was casting its shadow over Wall 
Street. In five hours of hysterical trading on October 2k, 
almost thirteen million shares (12,89^,650) were traded on 
the New York Stock Exchange. The number of shares traded 
was four million more than the previous record for transac­
tions in a single trading session. During the brief span of 
five hours, leading stocks fell anywhere from twenty to 
fifty points (Wall Street's Crisis, 1929)* On Tuesday, 
October 29 the number of transactions went into astronomical 
figures. More than sixteen million shares were traded on 
this date, with the total estimated loss approaching 
$1 5,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 (Wall Street's "Prosperity Panic," 1929)«
It was a combination, of fear and mob psychology which car­
ried the debacle to the absurd depths to which it plunged.
One can infer from taking a brief glimpse at the 
1929 stock market crash that the most predominant charac­
teristic of the small "unsuccessful" investor was his im­
pulsiveness. He appears to have been victimized by his own 
imagination (What Smashed the Bull Market, 1929)« This im­
pulsiveness, when coupled with his "sheep-like" conformity, 
led him down a one-way street. As a strict conformist, it 
was only natural that when a selling mania hit the market
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during its sharp tumble, he sold out with the rest of the 
crowd.
Fowler (188O) describes the successful speculator 
as being hard-headed and strong of nerve. Those speculators 
who are unsuccessful are characterized as "ghosts of the 
market. . . . They flit about the door-ways, and haunt the 
vestibule of the exchange, seedy of coat, . . . unkempt, un­
washed, unshorn, wearing on their worn and haggard faces a 
smile more melancholy than tears. They put up never a penny, 
and yet they are perpetually asking the prices of stocks 
which they never buy or sell (p. *+0 )."
Fuller (1 9 6 2) pictures the speculator as hopeful, 
although often times neurotic. Speculative members of the 
Wall Street cult pay only scant attention to such trivia as 
price : earnings (P:E) ratios, debt structure, cash flow, and 
corporate stability. Their sole objective is to get on and 
off the band wagon at the appropriate moment. The average 
speculator is continually revolving through a manic- 
depressive cycle. His high feelings of elation are momentary, 
only to be followed by intense feelings of depression.
According to Lefevre (1930), one of the greatest 
speculators specializing in making quick millions was Charles 
Topping. "He [was] a quiet, unassuming man, unimpressive in 
appearance, suggesting studious habits, personally shy, and 
the extreme opposite of picturesqueness . . .  I have never 
known anyone less communicative (p. 1 3)-''
If
How prevalent is stock market speculation today? To 
answer this question, one needs to only take a brief glimpse 
at the titles of recently published articles about Wall 
Street investment. Such titles as the following dominate 
the literature: "Big Casino" (1967), "Gamblers' Market:
Warning of Speculative Activity" (1967), "Old Fever Returns 
to the Street: Speculative Fever" (1967), "Speculation in
stocks, a Growing Worry" (1967), "Speculative Spree Alarms 
AMEX" (1 9 6 7), "Stock Speculation: a New Warning" (1 9 6 7), and
"When Wall Street Catches the Flu, 26 Million Americans Ache" 
(1969).
Until recently, brokers and market analysts soothed 
themselves and the public with their observations that the 
majority of speculation was carried on by sophisticated in­
vestors who were aware of the risks and could afford them 
(Wall Street: Plungers and Swingers, 1 9 6 7). However, it is
now recognized that speculation in the stock market is no 
longer the prerogative of a small wealthy subculture, as it 
was in the early 1900's (Engel, 1962). The quality of 
speculation has changed dramatically in the intervening 
years. Today, there are many uninformed and definitely un­
sophisticated individuals speculating on Wall Street-- 
individuals who are ill-equipped to financially afford the 
risks that they are taking (Engel, 1962; Fuller, 1962;
Smith, 1 9 6 9).
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The present study is concerned, not only with the 
relationship between the investor's personality and his 
success in stock market speculation, but also with the role 
of personality as a determinant in the composition of an 
investor's portfolio. To date, there has been no specific 
research devoted to studying an investor's personality char­
acteristics and their affect on the kind of stocks that he 
chooses to include in his portfolio. There are three types 
of data that pertain to how an individual selects his stocks: 
anecdotal data, data which have been derived from decision­
making models and theories, and data which have been con­
tributed by the relatively new theory of portfolio selection.
Anecdotal literature relates two primary means of 
selecting stocks. First, there is the easily procurred 
indirect tip, "that you get, say, from Henrietta Whimple's 
husband--you know the short fat one with the bad teeth--who 
has a brother in somebody's office— anyway, it's in Wall 
Street— who has a secretary who has a friend who works in 
Morgan's who said she'd just made a date for the Old Man to 
have lunch with J. W. Tickle of Tickle's Gum Arabic--which 
must mean something (Dayton, 1929, P* 30)." Then there is 
the sure-fire method of selecting stocks while blindfolded.
The traditional normative decision-making theory 
(Normative theories predict what an individual should do 
rather than what he actually does do.), is concerned with 
making choices among bets, and predicts that a gambler will
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choose that bet which has the highest expected value (EV).
Do individuals actually make bets in accordance to an 
"expected value" theory? Edwards (1955) believes that 
people not only do not bet according to this scheme, but it 
is even doubtful that they should. Bernoulli (1738, trans­
lated by Sommer, 195^) suggests that a gambler will choose 
that bet which he believes has the highest expected utility 
(EU).
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (19^7) have only recently 
made an attempt to revive Bernoulli's suggestion. They have 
assumed that expected utility (EU) maximization is a theory 
which actually describes what people will do in a given 
choice situation, rather than simply describing what people 
should do. Following in the footsteps of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, Hosteller and Nogee (1959) assumed the validity 
of the expected utility (EU) maximization model and then 
subsequently used it in order to experimentally measure the 
utility of relatively small amounts of money. Subjects did 
not demonstrate the high degree of consistency, with regard 
to their preferences and indifferences, as was previously 
postulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (19^7)- Friedman 
and Savage (1952) have attempted to make the "expected 
utility hypothesis" a scientific hypothesis i.e. one that 
would enable correct predictions to be made about an indi­
vidual's behavior. Presently, the available evidence does 
not contradict this hypothesis. However, it must be
7
emphasized that the opportunities for contradiction have been 
few and direct evidence in favor of the hypothesis has been 
meager.
Edwards (1955) presents a relatively simple mathe­
matical model in order to predict choices among bets. This 
model is based on the concepts of utility, subjective proba­
bility, and the theory of games. Edwards (195^) demon­
strated that a subject will prefer to bet at certain proba­
bilities, as opposed to others, and that a subject's 
preferences will generally be independent of the value of 
the money involved, as long as the monetary value does not 
get too large and as long as all the bets that are being con­
sidered have the same expected value (EV)
The current research dealing with the theory of 
portfolio selection provides specific data about why an in­
dividual selects a particular investment portfolio. 
Markowitz's (1959) theory of portfolio selection assumes 
that if the investor has a choice between two portfolios, he 
will prefer that portfolio with the lowest standard devia­
tion. If both portfolios have the same standard deviation, 
the investor will then prefer the one with the highest mean 
rate of return. The above theory is more than just a device 
for computing the most efficient portfolio; it also demon­
strates the tendency of the successful investor to avoid 
risk.
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To date, no objective index has been developed to 
accurately predict whether or not a given individual will be 
successful in investing in the stock market. There has been 
absolutely no scientific research conducted with respect to 
marketplace psychology. Is it possible that an index can 
be developed to predict the likelihood that a potential in­
vestor will be successful in the stock market, i.e. are 
there certain personality characteristics which can be used 
to differentiate the potentially successful investor from 
the potentially nonsuccessful investor? The present re­
search is concerned with identifying the distinguishing 
personality characteristics, or the personality profile, of 
the successful investor. These research findings should per­
tain not only to the private investor, but also to the 
broker or account executive, who is hired by the brokerage 
firm to invest money for its clients. Brokerage firms have 
only recently begun to research the emotional sphere of the 
marketplace. Presently, they are primarily concerned with 
the selection of trainable, potential brokers, i.e. indi­
viduals who will have a high probability of succeeding in 
the firm's training program. However, just because an in­
dividual is successful in a training program does not mean 
that he will succeed in making money for the firm's clients. 
Thus, trainability is not necessarily a good predictor of 
ultimate success as an investor. The ultimate criterion of 
successful investing for both the private investor and the
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broker will be his profit, whether it be for himself or for 
his clients. As there are as yet no tools available for ac­
curately predicting the probable success of a potential in­
vestor, the development and subsequent application of such 
an index could have far reaching economical benefits for 
individual investors, as well as brokerage firms.
The present study is thus primarily concerned with 
scientifically investigating the relationship between 
personality characteristics and stock market speculation.
Two major hypotheses are to be tested:
1. It is expected that there will be personality 
differences between those subjects who are successful in­
vestors and those subjects who are nonsuccessful investors.
2. It is expected that there will be personality 
differences between those subjects who are risk-takers and 
those subjects who are nonrisk-takers.
The following hypotheses have little, if any, basis 
in previous literature, but are considered in the present 
study as ancillary hypotheses:
3. It is expected that male subjects will be
greater risk-takers than female subjects.
It is expected that female subjects will be more 
successful than male subjects as investors.
5 . It is expected that those subjects who are non­
risk-takers will be more successful investors than those
subjects who are risk-takers.
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The .10 level of significance was necessary to 
reject the null form of the above hypotheses.^ Due to the 
exploratory nature of this study, the above level of sig­
nificance was chosen rather than the more stringent .05 
or .01 levels. In exploratory research type I errors are 
less important, while there is increased concern with re­
gard to limiting type II errors and thus increasing the 
power, i.e. the probability of detecting real differences 
if they are present.
METHOD AND PROCEDURE
Subjects
The subjects were 64- students enrolled in two sec­
tions of an Introductory Psychology course at the University 
of Oklahoma. Of the 152 students who originally began the 
study (i.e. those who selected stocks on the first day of 
the study), only those 21 male and 4-3 female students who 
were present for all eight testing sessions (October 29th 
to December 10th, 1969) were used in the final analyses.
Materials
The materials consisted of one test booklet per 
subject (see Appendix B). Each booklet contained instruc­
tions, information about sixteen stocks which had previously 
been selected by the experimenter, a questionnaire, an in­
vestment sophistication test, and additional sheets which
11
were used for inventorying weekly stock transactions and 
determining each subjects’ net worth^ for a particular week.
Stock list
Four stocks were selected from each of four in­
vestment categories (i.e. a total of sixteen stocks). These 
stocks were all chosen from either the New York or American 
Stock Exchange. The investment categories and the criteria 
for selecting those stocks within each category were as 
follows
1 . Exceptional Growth
A. The stock must have maintained a minimum 10^ 
average annual rate of growth, in per share 
earnings, over the last five years.
B. The stock must indicate a capability of ex­
tending its 10^ average annual rate of growth 
(i.e. estimated 1969 earnings per share^ must 
show a minimum increase of 10^ over actual 1968 
earnings per share)
C. The stock must have a combined return (annual 
per share earnings growth rate plus current 
yield) of at least 12^.
D. The current yield of the stock must not be 
greater than 2.%.
E. The stock must have a P:E ratio of at 
least 2 5 -
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2. Conservative Growth With Current Income
A. The stock must have maintained a minimum 
5.5^ average annual rate of growth, in per share 
earnings, over the last five years.
B. The stock must indicate a capability of 
extending its 5* 5^ average annual rate of growth 
(i.e. estimated 1969 earnings per share must 
show a minimum increase of 5-5% over actual 
1968 earnings per share).
C. The stock must have a combined return 
(annual per share earnings growth rate plus 
current yield) of at least 12^.
D. The current yield of the stock must not be 
less than 2.7%-
E. The stock must not have a P:E ratio greater 
than 12.5*
3 . High Risk
’ A. The stock has not maintained a minimum 
average annual rate of growth, in per share 
earnings, over the last five years.
B. The stock does not need to indicate a ca­
pacity of extending any minimum average annual 
rate of growth (i.e. estimated 1969 earnings 
per share do not need to show any minimum in­
crease, and may show a decrease, over actual 
1968 earnings per share).
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c. The stock does not need to have a minimum 
combined return (annual per share earnings 
growth rate plus current yield).
D. The current yield of the stock must not be 
greater than
E. The stock must have a P:E ratio of at 
least 2 5 .
Low Risk With High Current Return
A. The stock must have maintained a minimum 3%
average annual rate of growth, in per share 
earnings, over the last five years.
B. The stock must indicate a capability of 
extending its 3^ average annual rate of growth 
(i.e. estimated 1969 earnings per share must 
show a minimum increase of 3^ over actual 1968 
earnings per share).
C. The stock must have a combined return (annual
per share earnings growth rate plus current
yield) of at least Ç>%.
D. The current yield of the stock must not be 
less than ^.5^*
E. The stock must not have a P:E ratio greater 
than 1 5*
For the purposes of data analyses, categories 1 and 
3 were combined to represent those stocks with risk oriented 
investment objectives, and categories 2 and 4- were combined
14
to represent those stocks with conservative investment ob­
jectives. "Exceptional growth" and "conservative growth" 
are simply two other means of classifying risk and nonrisk 
oriented stocks without the blatant labels of "high risk" and 
"low risk," respectively.
Procedure
Each subject was given $^0,000 (hypothetically) with 
which to invest in one or more of sixteen stocks. These 
stocks were divided into four categories according to the 
investment objectives usually associated with purchases of 
them. The stocks were then numbered to prevent their names 
from biasing the subjects' selections (refer to APPENDIX C 
for the actual names of the sixteen stocks). It was felt 
that the subjects might be unduly impressed by popular brand 
names, and hence be prejudiced to purchase only "name 
stocks," while actual Wall Street speculators appear to be 
influenced more by fads, i.e. computer stocks were the rage 
in 1968 and oil stock in I9 6 9. A brief description was given 
regarding the principal business of each stock. Additional 
information about each stock's present price, price range 
during I9 6 9, present yield, and actual per share earnings 
for the previous five years along with estimated per share 
earnings for 1969 was presented.
The "Stock Market Game" was conducted at each of 
eight consecutive Wednesday class meetings. Subjects were 
given the last fifteen minutes of each of these class
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meetings to complete their market transactions. During the 
first session, subjects were able to make their initial 
stock selection(s). There were only two restrictions with 
regard to these initial purchases: (1) All transactions
(i.e. buying and selling) needed to be in multiples of 100 
shares and (2) initial stock purchases could not exceed 
$50,000 in total value. At each of the next six Wednesday 
class meetings, the current prices of all sixteen stocks 
(based on the previous Tuesday evening's closing stock 
market prices) were written on the black board. Subjects 
were then able to calculate the current value of their 
stocks and to decide whether they would like to keep their 
present stocks or to sell some, or all, of these stocks and 
buy different ones. The subjects were instructed that the 
sole objective of the "Stock Market Game" was to accumulate 
the largest amount of money possible within the investment 
period and that a prize of $10 was to be given to that in­
dividual, in each class, who was the most successful in­
vestor. At the eighth, and final, testing session subjects 
were required to sell all their remaining stocks at the 
previous day's closing market prices. They were then able 
to calculate their final total net worth.
Additional information was also obtained on the 
subjects during the testing sessions. Prior to the subject's 
initial stock selection, during the first testing session, 
they were given a stock market sophistication test. This
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test was given in order to equate the subjects with respect 
to their knowledge about the stock market.^ Demographic 
data were obtained on each subject during the second testing 
session. All subjects were administered the California 
Psychological Inventory (CPI) on the sixth testing day. The 
latter instrument is a self-report personality inventory 
that was developed for use with normal populations, age 13 
and above (Anastasi, 1968).
Variables
A successful investor was operationally defined as 
one who performed better than the Dow Jones Industrial Aver­
age, during the eight week investing period. From 
October 29th to December 10th, 1969, the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average lost 6h.6 points (down 7.6^). Thus to be considered 
successful, subjects needed to have a final net worth of at 
least $46,200. For the purpose of data analyses, subjects 
were rank ordered in terms of their final net worth. The 
top 27% were designated as the successful group and the 
bottom 27% as the nonsuccessful group. (The top and bottom 
27% are common cutoffs used in business oriented research.) 
This division established extreme criterion groups.
A risk-taker was operationally defined as one whose 
total dollar investments in risk oriented stocks (i.e. 
those stocks in categories 1 and 3) were greater than his 
total dollar investments in conservative oriented stocks 
(i.e. those stocks in categories 2 and 4). Once again, for
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the purpose of data analyses, the subjects were rank ordered 
in terms of the total amount of money which they invested 
in risk oriented stocks. In order to establish extreme 
criterion groups, the top 2']% were designated as the risk- 
taking group and the bottom 27^ as the nonrisk-taking group.
RESULTS
Hypothesis was tested by a 2 (success versus non­
success) X 18 (personality characteristics) repeated meas­
ures design with analysis of variance (Table 1). (The 
means and standard deviations are given in Table 2.) The 
personality characteristics predictive of successful in­
vesting were found by using two-sample t-tests (Table 3)-^ 
Hypothesis 1 was supported in that there was a difference be­
tween the personality characteristics of those subjects who 
were successful investors and those subjects who were non­
successful investors, F (1,32)=7.82, p < .01.
Hypothesis 2 was also tested by a 2 (risk versus 
nonrisk) x 18 (personality characteristics) repeated measures 
design with analysis of variance (Table h). (The means and 
standard deviations are given in Table 5«) The personality 
characteristics predictive of risk investing were found by 
using two-sample t-tests (Table 6).^ Hypothesis 2 was not 
supported in that those subjects who were risk-takers did 
not differ in terms of their personality characteristics 
from those subjects who were nonrisk-takers.
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Table 1
Summary of the Two-Way Repeated Measures Analysis of 
Variance for the Relationship of Personality 
Characteristics to Successful Investing
df MS F
Between subjects
Success (A) 1 3 ,1 5 2 . 5 0 7 .8 2**
Subjects within 
groups 32 1+0 3 . 2 0
Within subjects 578 X 1/I7=3k^
Personality (B) 17 X 1/17= ia 590 . 61 6 .54*
A X B 17 X 1/ 17= 1^ 1 7 5 . 6 3 1 . 3 5
B X subjects 
within groups 544 X 1/ 17=3 2^ 9 0 . 21
*P <.05
**P < .01
^The degrees of freedom for the within subject vari­
ables have been corrected for heterogeneity of variances 




Means and Standard Deviations for the Relationship of Per­
sonality Characteristics? to Successful Investing
Successful Nonsuccessful
X. S.D. N X. S.D. N
Do 10.6 17 4 3 . 6 9.1 17
Cs ^9.5 6.6 17 4l .6 7 . 3 17
sy 51.6 8.4 17 48.2 9 . 4 17
Sp 56.9 8 . 9 17 4 5 . 4 9.1 17
Sa 59.1+ 5 . 6 17 5 2 . 6 10.6 17
Wb 9 . 0 17 3 9 . 8 1 3 . 4 17
Re k7.8 10.2 17 4 5 . 0 9 . 9 17
So ^5.9 7 . 5 17 48.5 1 0 . 3 17
Sc ^ 0 . 9 12.1 17 43.8 11 .4 17
To ^6.5 10.4 17 3 8 . 3 12 .0 17
Gi 4 3 .2 8.1 17 4 l . 4 11.8 17
Cm 5 3 . 0 7 . 8 17 4 9 . 8 9 . 7 17
Ac 46.1 7 . 5 17 4 5 . 6 8.6 17
Ai 5 0 . 0 8.0 17 48.6 12.0 17
le 5 2 . 0 9 . 2 17 4 5 . 9 1 2 . 7 17
Py 5 0 . 4 9 . 4 17 4 3 . 0 1 3 . 2 17
Fx 58.0 11.4 17 48.5 10.0 17
Fe 5 0 . 4 9 . 2 17 5 1 . 9 9 . 6 17
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Table 3
Rank Order of Personality Characteristics as 
Predictors of Successful Investing^
Rank Personality Characteristic t
1 Dominance (Do) 3.%
2 Social Presence (Sp) 3.19
3 Capacity for Status (Cs) 3.16
4 Flexibility (Fx) 2.50
5 Tolerance (To) 2.05
6 Psychological Mindedness (Py) 1.80
7 Self-acceptance (Sa) 1.58
8 Sense of Well-being (Wb) 1.58
9 Intellectual Efficiency (le) 1 . 52
&Only those personality characteristics which, if 
tested, would be significant at the .10 level are included 
in the above rank order.
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Table k
Summary of the Two-Way Repeated Measures Analysis of 
Variance for the Relationship of Personality 
Characteristics to Risk Investing
df MS F
Between subjects 31
Risk (A) 1 1 1 3 . 9 2 1.00
Subjects within
groups 32 6 1 7 .8^
Within subjects 578 X 1/17=1!+^
Personality (B) 17 X 1/17= 1^ 3 6 2 . 6 1 4^22*
A X B 17 X 1/17= 1^ 2 . 9 2 1.00
B X Subjects
within groups 5̂ -̂ X 1/17=32% 8 5 . 9 8
*P <.05
^The degrees of freedom for the within subjects 
variables have been corrected for heterogeneity of variances 




Means and Standard Deviations for the Relationship of 
Personality Characteristics^ to Risk Investing
Risk--taking Nonrisk-taking
X. S.D. N X. S.D. N
Do 46.1 10.2 17 48.0 10.4 17
Cs 46.1 10.6 17 4 5 . 2 6 . 7 17
Sy 44.7 9 . 4 17 5 0 . 2 7 . 3 17
Sp 5 0 . 2 10.6 17 5 2 . 9 11.4 17
Sa 52.9 1 1 . 9 17 5 3 . 8 1 3 . 5 17
Wb 4 3 . 1 1 3 . 6 17 4 5 . 4 1 0 . 9 17
Re 46.0 11.4 17 48.2 10.4 17
So 44.8 11 .3 17 4 9 . 4 8.4 17
Sc 42.7 9 . 6 17 44.6 9 . 8 17
To 44.0 1 1 . 5 17 4 5 . 3 1 1 . 5 17
Gi 40.0 8.4 17 44.6 9.1 17
Cm 4 5 . 2 6 . 7 17 4 9 . 0 10.2 17
Ac 42.6 12.1 17 4 5 . 5 8.8 17
Ai 5 3 . 0 9 . 7 17 46.7 9 . 4 17
le 4 7 . 6 1 3 . 8 17 5 0 . 6 9 . 4 17
Py 48.2 11.6 17 4 7 . 6 1 0 . 9 17
Fx 56.1 12.0 17 5 2 . 7 1 0 . 7 17
Fe 4 9 . 8 10.1 17 4 7 . 6 9 .1 17
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Table 6
Rank Order of Personality Characteristics as 
Predictors of Risk Investing^
Rank Personality Characteristic t
1 Achievement via Independence (Ai) 1 .91
2 Sociability (Sy) 1.83
3 Communality (Cm) 1.60
1+ Good Impression (Gi) 1.43
®-Qnly those personality characteristics which, if 
tested, would be significant at the .10 level are included
in the above rank order.
2̂ -
Hvpothesis 3. was tested by a two-sample t-test 
(Table 7)» comparing males and females with respect to their 
risk-taking behavior. Hypothesis 3 was supported in that 
male and female subjects were found to differ in their 
risk investing, t (62)=1 .3 9 , p<.10. Male subjects took 
greater risks in investing than did female subjects.
Hypothesis ^ and 5 were tested by using a 2 (male 
versus female) x 2 (risk versus nonrisk) factorial design, 
with a two-way least squares analysis of variance (Table 8) 
(The means and standard deviations are given in Table 9*) 
Hypothesis |+ was supported in that male and female subjects 
differed in their success as investors, F (1,60)=4.37, p<.05. 
Female subjects were more successful as investors than were 
male subjects. Hypothesis 5 was not supported in that those 
subjects who were risk-takers did not differ in terms of their 
success as investors from those subjects who were nonrisk- 
takers.
DISCUSSION
Globally speaking, the successful investor's per­
sonality (Figure 1) appears to be more psychologically well- 
adjusted than does the nonsuccessful investor. Successful 
investors had a higher mean score on fifteen of the 
eighteen personality characteristics, that are measured by 
the California Psychological Inventory (CPI). On nine of
25 
Table 7








Summary of the Two-Way Least Squares Analysis of 
Variance for the Relationship of Sex and 
Risk to Successful Investing
df MS F
Sex (A) 1 2^,063,072.00 4 .3 5 *
Risk (B) 1 6 ,2 1 9 ,0 7 2 . 0 0 1 .12
A X B 1 3 5 7 ,8 2 7 . 0 0 1 .00





Means and Standard Deviations for the Relationship 
of Sex and Risk to Successful Investing
Risk-taking Nonrisk-taking
X. $46,7^7.44 $4 7 ,466, 1 6
Female S.D. 1 ,7 0 5 . 0 1 2 ,3 4 5 . 7 5
N 9 12
X. $44,801 . 2 5 $45,940.60
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these dimensions, the differences were such that if tested 
they would he significant at the .10 level. These nine dif­
ferentiating factors of successful investing are, in rank 
order of their predictive ability: Dominance, Social
Presence, Capacity for Status, Flexibility, Tolerance, Psy­
chological Mindedness, Self-acceptance. Sense of Well-being, 
and Intellectual Efficiency. The successful investor can 
probably be characterized as a self-assured, gregarious, and 
ambitious individual. He appears to be very resourceful and 
quite flexible and adaptable, with respect to his thinking 
and social behavior. This individual seems to have a high 
degree of intelligence, particularly in the verbal realm.
The nonsuccessful investor in contrast appears to be more 
apathetic, shy, a little self-restrained, and less ambitious.
It was not surprising that the psychologically well- 
adjusted, successful investor would also be more likely to 
invest in conservative stocks. During the period in which 
the present study was conducted (October 29, 1969 to 
December 10, 1969) the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 
7 .6^. The successful investor thus needed to be more re­
sourceful and adaptable in order to cope with the bad market. 
Although a different composite personality profile (Figure 2) 
was not found between the risk-taking investor and the non- 
risk-taking investor, four personality characteristics did 
appear to discriminate between them. As the main effect 
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Fig. 2. Personality profiles of risk-taking and nonrisk-taking investors.
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that were found for these four factors could have occurred 
by chance. The four differentiating characteristics of risk 
investing are, in order of their predictive ability: Achieve­
ment via Independence, Sociability, Communality, and Good 
Impression. On all of the above dimensions, the differences 
between the risk-taker and the nonrisk-taker were such that 
if tested they would be significant at the .10 level. The 
risk-taking investor appears to be very demanding, inde­
pendent, and some what detached from society— not being very 
concerned with the needs and wants of those around him. In 
contrast, the nonrisk-taker appears to be outgoing, tact­
ful in his social encounters, and somewhat more concerned 
with the impression that he makes on other people. Globally 
speaking, the nonrisk-taker seems more psychologically well- 
adjusted than the risk-taker. The nonrisk-takers had a 
higher mean score on thirteen of the eighteen personality 
characteristics, that were measured in the present study.
Several writers (Fowler, I8 8O; Fuller, 1962; Smith, 
1 9 6 9) have postulated that the marketplace seems to have pre­
dominantly feminine characteristics and therefore should be 
better understood by the female investor. To follow this 
reasoning to its logical conclusion would be to then hypothe­
size that women should be more successful investors than men. 
Although the aforementioned writers only hint at this con­
clusion, in the present research women were found to be more 
successful than men as investors. Perhaps, the major
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determinant of the female subjects' successful investing was 
her significantly more conservative investment behavior i.e. 
female subjects had a higher probability of investing in 
conservative oriented stocks, while male subjects were more 
likely to invest in risk oriented stocks.
As in any research project in which the subjects have 
not been randomly sampled from a normal population, there are 
certain restrictions on the present study, with regard to the 
generalizations which can be drawn. Although these par­
ticular findings must, of necessity, be limited to describing 
the investment behavior of the 64 subjects sampled in this 
study, the research methodology that has evolved from the 
present research can be applied to a more normal population, 
such as a random sample of private investors or a random 
sample of brokers within a particular brokerage firm. The 
resultant set of personality characteristics which are found 
to distinguish between the successful and nonsuccessful in­
vestors could then be used as a diagnostic aid to the private 
investor and as a selection device for brokerage firms.
These research findings thus need to be validated in a more 
life-like situation where the investor is using real rather 
than hypothetical money, where he is not limited with re­
spect to the stocks from which he can choose, and where the 
study can be conducted over a time span which is long enough 
to include a greater variety of the erratic swings in stock 
market prices that are typically observed on Wall Street.
33
Findings from the present study indicate that there 
are major differences in the personality characteristics of 
the successful and nonsuccessful investor as well as for the 
risk-taking and nonrisk-taking investor. Female subjects had 
a higher probability of investing in conservative oriented 
stocks, while male subjects were more likely to invest in 
risk oriented stocks. An additional finding was that female 
subjects were more successful investors than male subjects. 
Perhaps, of even greater importance than the actual research 
findings presented here, is the development of a research 
methodology for obtaining objective personality character­
istics which distinguish between potentially successful in­
vestors and potentially nonsuccessful investors. As the first 
known attempt to scientifically investigate marketplace psy­
chology, the present study has demonstrated an approach which 
should aid in raising the study of stock market behavior out 
of its anecdotal abyss.
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FOOTNOTES
1 . Although a more lenient level of significance was
selected, only hypothesis 3.5 of those hypotheses found to 
be significant, was rejected at this level, i.e. the .10 
level of significance. Hypotheses 1. and 4 were rejected 
at the more stringent .01 and .05 levels, respectively.
2. A subject's net worth is equal to the market value of his
stocks plus his cash balance.
3. The technical terms, that are used to describe the in­
vestment categories and the criteria for selecting those 
stocks within each category, are in common usage in 
market parlance.
4. Estimated 1969 earnings per share were obtained from
analysts at Francis I duPont, One Wall Street, New York
City, New York.
5 . The sophistication test did not discriminate between the 
sophisticated and nonsophisticated "student investor."
It was quite apparent that the subjects had very little 
knowledge about the stock market.
6. As the A X B interaction effect was not significant, post 
hoc comparisons of cell means were inappropriate. Thus 
the t-tests, as used here, are performed strictly for 
descriptive analyses. The higher the t value, the 
greater is the predictive ability of a given personality 
characteristic.
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7. The eighteen personality variables on the California 
Psychological Inventory (CPI) are: Dominance (Do),
Capacity for Status (Cs), Sociability (Sy), Social 
Presence (Sp), Self-acceptance (Sa), Sense of Well­
being (Wb), Responsibility (Re), Socialization (So), 
Self-control (Sc), Tolerance (To), Good Impression (Gi), 
Commonality (Cm), Achievement via Conformance (Ac), 
Achievement via Independence (Ai), Intellectual Ef­
ficiency (le). Psychological Mindedness (Py), Flexi­
bility (Fx), and Femininity (Fe).
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The present research will be the first known attempt 
to scientifically investigate the relationship between per­
sonality correlates and stock market speculation. All 
previous data concerning the personality dimensions of the 
successful Investor falls within the anecdotal realm. There 
is a preponderance of "fundamentals" in the marketplace, but 
the unexplored area is the emotional area. All the charts, 
breadth indices, and technical palavar are the statistician's 
feeble attempt to describe the emotional state of the in­
vesting public. There is substantial work to be done in this 
realm, but so far no one has taken marketplace psychology as 
an area worthy of intensive study. If the statistical area 
has been and is being so thoroughly explored, why shouldn't 
someone scientifically investigate this unexplored emotional 
sphere (Smith, 1969)?
As very little "hard data" is available on the 
personality correlates or emotional makeup of successful
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versus nonsuccessful investors, it may be helpful to look 
back at the investing public's reactions to various erratic 
swings in stock market prices, since the "marketplace" is 
really a reflection of mass psychology (Engel, 1962; Smith, 
1969)* Modern-day stock market history can be dated from the 
early 1900's (Engel, 1962). The movement of the stock 
prices during the period from 1900 to the middle of 1929 is 
aptly described by Dice (1929) in language almost as 
speculator as the behavior of the market itself. Successive 
periods were labeled "The McKinley-Roosevelt Boom," "The 
Coolidge Boom," and "The Hoover Boom." Thus, there had been 
two great bull markets previous to the incomparable boom 
which followed the election of Herbert Hoover. The pre­
dominant question being asked by both the public and the in­
vestors, alike, in late 1928 was, "Has a reasonably level 
headed people suddenly gone mad with a mania for speculation 
and created a situation which is headed for a catyclysmic 
collapse, or is there sound reason for the wild dervish dance 
which has dragged into its mazes hundreds of thousands of 
persons of every class whose previous financial operations 
involved no more risk than the maintenance of a savings ac­
count or the purchase of a liberty bond (The Dance of the 
Billions, 1928). " The "boom" atmosphere of 1928 which re­
sulted in swift and easy winnings for the now rapidly grow­
ing number of amateur speculators, during weeks when almost 
every high volume stock was climbing to incredible new
^2
heights, produced a kind of intoxicating or mesmerizing af­
fect on the entire country.
Not until mid 1929 did the stock market show any 
major signs of weakness. In early October of 1929, the 
greatest stock market crash in financial history was casting 
its shadow over Wall Street. In five hours of hysterical 
trading on October 24, almost thirteen million shares 
(1 2,8 9 4,6 5 0) were traded on the New York Stock Exchange. The 
number of shares traded was four million more than the 
previous record for transactions in a single trading session. 
During the brief span of five hours, leading stocks fell 
anywhere from twenty to fifty points (Wall Street's Crisis, 
1 9 2 9)" On Tuesday, October 29 the number of transactions 
went into astronomical figures. More than sixteen million 
shares were traded on this date, with the total estimated 
loss approaching $15,000,000,000 (Wall Street's Prosperity 
Panic," 19 2 9)' It was a combination of fear and mob psy­
chology which carried the debacle to the absurd depths that 
it plunged. Most market analysts were in agreement that the 
October catastrophe on Wall Street was strictly a stock 
market panic. Fisher (1930) states vehemently that the prime 
fault for the market crash of 1929 lay in the overeagerness 
of the investor to make a profit. Trouble developed as cheap 
money brought in an ever increasing number of speculators who 
were able to borrow and subsequently purchase stocks with the 
sole hope of "breaking the bank."
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One can infer from taking a brief glimpse at the 1929 
stock market crash that the most predominant characteristic 
of the small "unsuccessful" investor was his impulsiveness.
He appears to have been victimized by his own imagination 
(What Smashed the Bull Market, 1929) « This impulsiveness, 
when coupled with his "sheep-like" conformity, led him down a 
one-way street. As a strict conformist, it was only natural 
that when a selling mania hit the market during its sharp 
tumble, he sold out with the rest of the crowd. This influx 
of selling only served to further perpetuate the market's 
downfall (The Men Who Did It, 1929)-
"If" and "but" are said to be the most frequent con­
junctions in the speculator's vocabulary. The speculator is 
pictured as an extreme rationalizer. His life has been a 
series of regrets. Strangely enough, he is more concerned 
with rationalizing the fortune he might have made, rather 
than rationalizing the fortune which he has actually lost 
(Fowler, 1880).
There is an apparent leveling of social class lines 
and conventionalities in the domain of speculation. Indi­
viduals from all classes are equally represented in the realm 
of stock speculation. The only distinctions made on Wall 
Street are with respect to whether or not an individual is 
a successful or nonsuccessful speculator (Engel, 1962;
Fuller, 1962; Smith, 1 9 6 9).
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Fowler (I8 8O) describes the successful speculator as 
being hard-headed and strong of nerve. Those speculators who 
are unsuccessful are characterized as "ghosts of the market.
. . . They flit about the door-ways, and haunt the vestibule 
of the exchange, seedy of coat, . . . unkempt, unwashed, 
unshorn, wearing on their worn and haggard faces a smile more 
melancholy than tears. They put up never a penny, and yet 
they are perpetually asking the prices of stocks which they 
never buy or sell (p. 4o)."
Fuller (1 9 6 2) pictures the speculator as hopeful, 
although often times neurotic. Speculative members of the 
Wall Street cult pay only scant attention to such trivia as 
price learnings (P:E) ratios, debt structure, cash flow, and 
corporate stability. Their sole objective is to get on and 
off the band wagon at the appropriate moment. The average 
speculator is continually revolving through a manic-depressive 
cycle. His high feelings of elation are momentary, only to 
be followed by intense feelings of depression.
According to Lefevre (1930), one of the greatest 
speculators specializing in making quick millions was 
Charles Topping. "He (was) a quiet, unassuming man, unim­
pressive in appearance, suggesting studious habits, per­
sonally shy, and the extreme opposite of picturesqueness . . . 
I have never known anyone less communicative (p. 13)*"
Niccolas Darvas (1962), the present-day Charles 
Topping, stresses the importance of cautiousness as an
V5
essential characteristic of the successful investor. "I 
gamble, yes. But I gamble with the caution born of ex­
perience. One thing I know: If I'm burned by something, I
stay away from it (p. 182)."
Dr. Charles McArthur (Smith, 1969) of Harvard Uni­
versity has used ink blots in an effort to distinguish the 
personality characteristics of successful analysts and port­
folio managers. He has discovered that there are personality 
differences between the analyst who is good at picking the 
right stocks and the portfolio manager whose job it is to 
call the shots with regard to the correct time to buy or sell 
stocks. The good stock analyst is characterized as having a 
high aptitude, with respect to both words and numbers. How­
ever, his abilities in the abstract realm are far from 
superior. In contrast, the good portfolio manager is a very 
intent individual who has a high degree of emotional maturity. 
An additional and very important prerequisite for the latter 
individual is that he must be able to function without undue 
anxiety.
How prevalent is stock market speculation today?
To answer this question, one needs to only take a brief 
glimpse at the titles of recently published articles about 
investment on Wall Street. Such titles as: "Big Casino" 
(1967 )5 "Gamblers' Market: Warning of Speculative Activity" 
(1967 )5 "Speculation in Stocks, a Growing Worry" (1967)5  
"Speculative Spree Alarms AMEX" (1967)5 "Stock Speculation:
-̂6
a New Warning" (I9 6 7), and "When Wall Street Catches the Flu, 
26 Million Americans Ache" (1969) dominate the literature.
Until recently, brokers and market analysts soothed 
themselves and the public with their observations that the 
majority of speculation was being engaged in by sophisticated 
investors who were aware of the risks and could afford them 
(Wall Street: Plungers and Swingers, 196?). However, it is
now recognized that speculation in the stock market is no 
longer the prerogative of a small wealthy subculture, as it 
was in the early 1900's (Engel, 1962). The quality of spec­
ulation has changed dramatically in the intervening years. 
Today, there are an awful lot of uninformed and definitely 
unsophisticated individuals speculating on Wall Street-- 
individuals who are ill-equipped to financially afford the 
risks that they are taking (Engel, 1962; Fuller, 1962;
Smith, 1969)'
The present study is concerned, not only with the 
relationship between the investor's personality correlates 
and his success in stock market speculation, but also with 
the role of personality correlates as a determinant in the 
composition of an investor's portfolio. To date, there has- 
been no specific research devoted to studying an investor's 
personality characteristics and their affect on the kind of 
stocks that he chooses to include in his portfolio. There 
are three types of data that pertain to how an individual 
selects his stocks: anecdotal data, data that has been
If?
derived from decision-making models and theories, and data 
that has been contributed by the relatively new theory of 
portfolio selection.
Anecdotal literature relates two primary means of 
selecting stocks. First, there is the easily procurred in­
direct tip, "that you get, say, from Henrietta Whimple's 
husband— you know the short fat one with the bad teeth— who
has a brother in somebody's office--anyway, it's in Wall
Street— who has a secretary who has a friend who works in
Morgan's who said she'd just made a date for the Old Man to
have lunch with J. W. Tickle of Tickle's Gum Arabic— which 
must mean something (Dayton, 1929, P- 30).'' Then there is 
the sure-fire method of selecting stocks while blindfolded.
The traditional normative decision-making theory 
(Normative theories predict what an individual should do 
rather than what he actually does do.), that is concerned 
with making choices among bets, predicts that a gambler will 
choose that bet which has the highest expected value (EV).
In the above discussion the expected value (EV) of a bet is 
the amount which the gambler will receive if he wins a par­
ticular bet.
Do individuals actually make bets in accordance to 
an "expected value" theory? Edwards (1955) believes that 
people not only do not bet according to this scheme, but it 
is even doubtful that they should. Bernoulli (l?38, trans­
lated by Sommer, 195^) suggests that a gambler will choose
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that bet which he believes has the highest expected utility 
(EU). The expected utility (EU) of a bet is represented as: 
EU= In this equation û  ̂is the utility or the sub­
jective value of the ĵ th outcome of a particular bet. Simply 
stated, Bernoulli believes that the utility or the subjective 
value of a bet can be substituted for its objective value when 
calculating the expected value (EU) of the particular bet.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (194?) have only recently 
made an attempt to revive Bernoulli's suggestion. They have 
assumed that expected utility (EU) maximization is a theory 
which actually describes what people will do in a given 
choice situation, rather than simply describing what people 
should do. Following in the footsteps of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (194?), Hosteller and Nogee (1959) assumed the 
validity of the expected utility (EU) maximization model and 
then subsequently used it in order to experimentally measure 
the utility of relatively small amounts of money. Subjects 
did not demonstrate the high degree of consistency, with 
regard to their preferences and indifferences, as was previ­
ously postulated by von Neumann and Morgenstren (194?)• In­
stead, subjects revealed a graded response— gradually in­
creasing their frequency of risk-taking behavior, as the 
monetary value of the risk increased. An additional, and 
very interesting finding was that some subjects, despite ex­
tensive instructions and experiences, continued to make wagers 
which led to monetary losses in the long run.
1+9
Friedman and Savage (19^8) have used a relatively 
simple extension of the orthodox utility analysis to explain 
the behavior of individuals in a risk-taking situation. Their 
basic assumption is that individuals frequently must choose 
between alternatives, which differ in terms of the degree of 
risk. The clearest example of such a "choice" situation is 
provided by insurance and gambling. When someone buys fire 
insurance on his home, he is accepting a certain small loss 
(the insurance premium) in preference to the small risk of a 
large loss (the value of the home). Thus he is choosing 
certainty in preference to uncertainty. On the other hand, 
the individual who gambles i.e. buys a lottery ticket, is 
choosing uncertainty in preference to certainty. This indi­
vidual is subjecting himself to a large chance of losing a 
small amount (the price of the lottery ticket) and the small 
chance of winning a large amount (the prize). Friedman and 
Savage (1952) have attempted to make the "expected utility 
hypothesis" a scientific hypothesis i.e. one that would enable 
correct predictions to be made about an individual's behavior. 
Presently, the available evidence does not contradict this 
hypothesis. However, it must be emphasized bhat the oppor­
tunities for contradiction have been few and direct evidence 
in favor of the hypothesis has been meager.
Edwards (1955) presents a relatively simple mathe­
matical model in order to predict choices among bets. This 
model is based on the concepts of utility, subjective
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probability, and the theory of games. He (Edwards, 195^) has 
been able to demonstrate that a subject will prefer to bet 
at certain probabilities, as opposed to others, and that a 
subject's preferences will generally be independent of the 
value of the money involved, as long as the monetary value 
does not get too large and as long as all the bets that are 
being considered have the same expected value (EV). An ad­
ditional finding was that a subject will prefer less favor­
able bets which have preferred probabilities, as opposed to 
more favorable bets which have less-preferred probabilities. 
Two patterns of probability preferences were discovered: one
for bets having a positive expected value (EV) and one for 
bets with a negative expected value (EV). Using the sub­
jectively expected utility maximization model, Edwards (1955) 
found that subjective probabilities are a more important de­
terminant, than are utilities, in predicting an individual's 
choice among bets. These results are inconsistent with the 
more traditional expected utility (EU) model.
The current research dealing with the theory of 
portfolio selection provides specific data about why an in­
dividual selects a particular investment portfolio. 
Markowitz's (1959) theory of portfolio selection assumes 
that if the investor has a choice between two portfolios, he 
will prefer that portfolio with the lowest standard devia­
tion. If both portfolios have the same standard deviation, 
the investor will prefer the one with the highest mean
51
rate of return. The above theory is more than just a device 
for computing the most efficient portfolio; it also demon­
strates the tendency of the successful investor to avoid 
risk. It is predicted that the investor who is indifferent 
to risk-taking or who actually prefers risk-taking will put 
all his money into a single security. If the investor is 
completely indifferent, he will put all his money in the 
security with the highest rate of return, regardless of the 
risk.
Sharpe (1963) has extended Markowitz's (1959) work 
on portfolio analysis. Obviously, portfolio analysis re­
quires a large number of comparisons between various sets of 
securities. Thus any set of assumptions which can reduce 
this computational task will greatly facilitate the practical 
application of portfolio theory. One such set of assumptions 
is provided by the diagonal model. The major advantage of 
this model is that it enables the investigator to account for 
the interrelationships among various securities.
To date, no objective indice has been developed to 
accurately predict whether or not a given individual will be 
successful in investing in the stock market. There has been 
absolutely no scientific research with respect to marketplace 
psychology. Is it possible that an indice can be developed 
to predict the likelihood that a potential investor will be 
successful in the stock market, i.e. are there certain per­
sonality correlates which can be used to differentiate the
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potentially successful investor from the potentially non­
successful investor? The present research is concerned with 
identifying the distinguishing personality correlates, or the 
personality profile, of the successful investor. These re­
search findings will pertain not only to the private investor, 
but also to the broker or account executive, who is hired by 
the brokerage firm to invest money for its clients. Broker­
age firms have only recently begun to research the emotional 
sphere of the marketplace. Presently, they are primarily 
concerned with the selection of trainable, potential brokers
i.e. individuals who will have a high probability of succeed­
ing in the firms training program. However, just because an 
individual is successful in a training program does not mean 
that he will succeed in making money for the firm's clients. 
Thus, trainability is not necessarily a good predictor of 
ultimate success as an investor. The ultimate criterion of 
successful investing for both the private investor and the 
broker will be how much profit he makes, whether it be for 
himself or for his clients. As there are as yet no tools 
available for accurately predicting the probable success of 
a potential investor, the development and subsequent applica­
tion of such an indice could have far reaching economical 
benefits for individual investors, as well as brokerage 
firms.
The present study is thus primarily concerned with 
scientifically investigating the relationship between
53
personality correlates and stock market speculation. Two 
major hypotheses are to be tested:
1 . It is expected that there will be a difference 
between those subjects who are successful investors and 
those subjects who are nonsuccessful investors, in terms of 
their personality correlates.
2. It is expected that there will be a difference 
between those subjects who are risk-takers and those subjects 
who are nonrisk-takers, in terms of their personality cor­
relates .
The following hypotheses have no bases in previous 
literature, but are considered in the present study as 
ancillary hypotheses :
3. It is expected that male subjects will be greater 
risk-takers than female subjects.
4. It is expected that female subjects will be more 
successful than male subjects as investors.
5. It is expected that those subjects who are 
nonrisk-takers will be more successful investors than those 
subjects who are risk-takers.
The .10 level of significance was necessary to reject 




The subjects were 6k students enrolled in two sec­
tions of an Introductory Psychology course at the University 
of Oklahoma. Of the 152 students who originally began the 
study (i.e. those who selected stocks on the first day of 
the study), only those 21 male and 43 female students who 
were present for all eight testing sessions were used in the 
final analyses.
Materials
The materials consisted of one test booklet per sub­
ject. Each booklet contained instructions, information 
about sixteen stocks which had previously been selected by 
the experimenter, a questionnaire, an investment sophisti­
cation test, and additional sheets which were used for in­
ventorying weekly stock transactions and determining each 
subject's net worth"* for a particular week.
"*A subject's total net worth is equal to the market 




Four stocks were selected from each of four invest­
ment categories (i.e. a total of sixteen stocks). These
stocks were all chosen from either the New York or American
Stock Exchange. The investment categories and the criteria 
for selecting those stocks within each category were as 
follows :
1. Exceptional Growth
A. The stock must have maintained a minimum
10^ average annual rate of growth, in per share
earnings, over the last five years.
B. The stock must indicate a capability of 
extending its Q̂i% average annual rate of growth
p(i.e. estimated 19^9 earnings per share must 
show a minimum increase of ^0% over actual 1968 
earnings per share).
C. The stock must have a combined return (annual 
per share earnings growth rate plus current 
yield) of at least ^2%.
D. The current yield of the stock must not be 
greater than 2%.
E. The stock must have a P:E ratio of at 
least 2 5 -
^Estimated 1969 earnings per share were obtained from 
analysts at Francis I dupont. One Wall Street, New York City, 
New York.
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2. Conservative Growth With Current Income
A. The stock must have maintained a minimum 
5.5^ average annual rate of growth, in per share 
earnings, over the last five years.
B. The stock must indicate a capability of ex­
tending its 5*5^ average annual rate of growth 
(i.e. estimated 1969 earnings per share (see 
Footnote 2) must show a minimum increase of 5*5^ 
over actual 1968 earnings per share).
C. The stock must have a combined return (annual 
per share earnings growth rate plus current 
yield) of at least 12^.
D. The current yield of the stock must not be 
less than 2.']%.
E. The stock must not have a P:E ratio greater 
than 12.5'
3 . High Risk
A. The stock has not maintained a minimum aver­
age annual rate of growth, in per share earnings, 
over the last five years.
B. The stock does not need to indicate a ca­
pacity of extending any minimum average annual 
rate of growth (i.e. estimated 1969 earnings per 
share (see Footnote 2) do not need to show any 
minimum increase, and may show a decrease, over 
actual 1968 earnings per share).
57
C. The stock does not need to have a minimum 
combined return (annual per share earnings growth 
rate plus current yield).
D. The current yield of the stock must not be 
greater than
E. The stock must have a P:E ratio of at 
least 2 5 .
4. Low Risk With High Current Return
A. The stock must have maintained a minimum yfo
average annual rate of growth, in per share 
earnings, over the last five years.
B. The stock must indicate a capability of ex­
tending its yfo average annual rate of growth 
(i.e. estimated 19^9 earnings per share (see 
Footnote 2) must show a minimum increase of 3% 
over actual 1968 earnings per share).
C. The stock must have a combined return (annual
per share earnings growth rate plus current
yield) of at least 8^.
D. The current yield of the stock must not be 
less than 4.5^*
E. The stock must not have a P:E ratio greater 
than 15"
For the purposes of data analyses, categories 1 and 
3 were combined to represent those stocks with risk oriented 
investment objectives, and categories 2 and 4 were combined
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to represent those stocks with conservative investment ob- 
jectives.
Procedure
Each subject was given $50,000 (hypothetically) with 
which to invest in one or more of sixteen stocks. Those 
stocks were divided into four categories according to the in­
vestment objectives usually associated with purchases of 
them. The stocks were then numbered to prevent their names 
from biasing the subject’s selections (refer to APPENDIX C for 
the actual names of the sixteen stocks), and a brief descrip­
tion was given regarding the principal business of each 
stock. Additional information about each stock’s present 
price, price range during 1969, present yield, and actual 
per share earnings for the previous five years along with 
estimated per share earnings for 1969 (see Footnote 2) was 
presented.
The ’’Stock Market Game" was conducted at each of 
eight consecutive Wednesday class meetings. During the first 
session, subjects were able to make their initial stock se­
lection's). There were only two restrictions with regard to 
these initial purchases: (1) All transactions (i.e. buying
and selling) needed to be in multiples of 100 shares and 
(2) initial stock purchases could not exceed $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 in total 
value. At each of the next six Wednesday class meetings, 
the current price of all sixteen stocks (based on the previous 
Tuesday evening’s closing stock market prices) were written on
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the black board. Subjects were then able to calculate the 
current value of their stocks and to decide whether they 
would like to keep their present stocks or to sell some, or 
all, of these stocks and buy different ones. The subjects 
were instructed that the sole objective of the "Stock Market 
Game" was to accumulate the largest amount of money possible 
within the investment period and that a prize of $10 was to 
be given to that individual, in each class, who was the most 
successful investor. At the eighth, and final, testing ses­
sion subjects were required to sell all their remaining 
stocks at the previous day's closing market prices. They 
were then able to calculate their final total net worth (see 
Footnote 1).
Additional information was also obtained on the sub­
jects during the testing sessions. Prior to the subjects 
selecting their initial stocks, during the first testing 
session, they were given a stock market sophistication test. 
Demographic data were obtained on each subject during the 
second testing session. All subjects were administered the 
California Psychological Inventory (CPI) on the sixth test­
ing day.
Variables
A subject was operationally defined as a successful 
investor if he performed better than the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average, during the eight week investing period. From 
October 29th to December 10th, 1969, the Dow Jones Industrial
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Average lost 64^6 points or was down 7*6^. Thus to be con­
sidered successful, subjects needed to have a final net worth 
(see Footnote 1) of at least $46,200. For the purposes of 
data analyses, subjects were rank ordered in terms of their 
final net worth (see Footnote 1). The top 2']% were designated 
as the successful group and the bottom 27^ as the nonsuccess­
ful group. This division was made in order to establish 
extreme criterion groups.
A subject was operationally defined as a risk-taker if 
his total investments in risk oriented stocks (i.e. those 
stocks in categories 1 and 3) were greater than his total 
investments in conservative oriented stocks (i.e. those stocks 
in categories 2 and 4). Once again, for the purposes of data 
analyses, the subjects were rank ordered in terms of their 
total money which was invested in risk oriented stocks. The 
top 2 7^ were designated as the risk-taking group and the bot­
tom 27^ as the nonrisk-taking group. This division was also 
made in order to establish extreme criterion groups.
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"The Stock Market Game"
Mr. Bill Baker
You will be given $50j000 (hypothetically) with which 
to invest in one or more of the sixteen stocks listed below. 
These stocks have been numbered in order to prevent their 
names from biasing your choices. However, all of the stocks 
listed actually represent real companies, whose stock is 
presently being traded on major stock exchanges in the United 
States. The sixteen stocks have also been divided into four 
categories, according to the investment objectives usually 
associated with purchases of these particular stocks, and a 
brief description is given regarding the principal business 
of each stock.
Today, you will have the opportunity to choose your 
stock or stocks. There are only two restrictions regarding 
your initial purchases. (1) All transactions (i.e. buying 
and selling) must be in multiples of 100 shares. (2) Your 
initial purchases musu not exceed $50,000 in total value.
Each Wednesday (starting next week) at the beginning of class, 
1 will list the present prices of each stock. You will then 
be able to figure up the current value of your stocks and to
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decide whether you would like to keep your present stocks or 
to sell some, or all, of these stocks and buy different ones. 
Your objective is to aooumulate the largest amount of money 
possible within the next six weeks. You will be competing 
against your fellow classmates to see who can accumulate the 
greatest amount of wealth within this time limit. Every two 
weeks, I will post a rank-ordered list with your names and the 
total value of your present stocks on the classroom door. At 
the end of six weeks a prize will be presented to the indi­
vidual having the most money.
Below are the sixteen stocks from which you may choose 
your stock, or stocks.
Exceptional Growth 
Stock #1....Fast food Franchiser
Present Price Price Range (1969) Yield
$54^00 52 1/4 -3 5 .2#
Per Share Earnings 
(est)69 68 67 66 65 64
1 .30  . 7 8 . 4 5 .24 .11 0
Stock #2....Producer and marketer of equipment and supplies 
for photocopying
Present Price Price Range (1969) Yield
$114.88 104-85 1/4 .6%
Per Share Earnings 
(est)69 68 67 66 65 64
2 . 0 5  1 . 7 3 1.48 1.24 .93 .63
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Stock #3 ....Soft drink manufacturer
Present Price
$5 0 . 2 5
Price Range (1969) 
5^-^3 1 A
Per Share Earnings
(est)69 68 67 66 65 6^
1 . 6 0 1 ,3^ 1 . 1 5 . 97 .80 .63
Stock #+... .Discount variety chain
Present Price
$5 7 . 0 0
Price Range (1969) 
56 1/4-37 1/2
Per Share Earnings
(est)69 68 67 66 65 64




Conservative Growth with Current Income
Stock # 5 ....Producer of a broad array of materials and com­
ponents essential for end products made by auto, 
construction, electronics, aerospace, metal, and 
other major industries
Present Price
$3 0 . 3 8





(est)69 68 67 66 65 64
2 . 4 5  2 . 2 3 1 . 93 1 . 7 6 1 . 3 3 1 . 06
Stock #6 ....Owns a branch of banks in the United States
Present Price
$5 3 . 2 5





(est)69 68 67 66 65 64
4.10 3 . 8 0  3 . 3 5 3.14 2 . 9 3  2.69
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Stock #7 ••••Department store operator
Present Price 
$36.88
Price Range (1969) 
>+0 - 3 0  1 / 2
Per Share Earnings
(est)69 68 67 66 65 64-
2.50 2 . 31 2 . 0 8 1 .94 1.65 1.23
Stock #8 ....Canadian distiller
Present Price 
$>+3.88
Price Range (1969) 
1/2-36 1/2
Per Share Earnings
(est) 69 68 67 66 6 5 64





Stock #9....Manufacturer of mobile homes
Present Price
$3 0 . 1 3
Price Range (1969) 
38 1/4 - 1 8  1 / 2
Per Share Earnings
(est)69









Stock #10....Manufacturer of environmental controls and 
security systems
Present Price
$1 5 2 . 5 0





(est)69 68 67 66 65
4 . 1 5  3.41 2.85 3 . 0 7 2.61
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Stock #11....Manufacturer of tape and recording equipment
Present Price
$ 4 7 .50
Price Range (1969) 




(est)69 68 67 66 65 64
1 . 6 0 1 . 3 5 . 8 0 1 . 0 9 .91 .83
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Stock #12....General construction contractor, land and com­




Price Range (1969) 
23 1/2 - 1 0 1 / 2
Per Share Earnings
(est)69 68 67 66 65 6 -̂
. 7 0 . 3 5 . 16 - . 1 2  -2 .0^ . 28
Yield0
Low Risk with High Current Return 
Stock #13'"'.Distributor of gas and electricity
Present Price
#2 2 . 1 8




(est)69 68 67 66 65 64
1 . 7 8 1 . 6 8 1 . 58 1.48 1 . 3 9 1 . 3 4
Stock #l4....United States and international oil company
Present Price#32.25 Price Range ( 1969)49-32
Per Share Earnings
(est)69 68 67 66 65 64
3 . 2 0  3 . 0 2 2 . 7 9 2.44 2 . 0 6  1.91
Stock #l5'-'.Gas pipeline and oil company
Present Price#25.63 Price Range (1969)32-23 1/2
Per Share Earnings
(est)69 68 67 66 65 64
2.40 2.21 1 . 9 5 1.88 1 . 7 0 1 . 52






(est)69 68 67 66 65 64






















Total Amount of Stocks —
Plus Cash




Value of your Present Stocks 








Total Amount of Stocks __________
Plus Cash __________
Total Net Worth __________
Transactions 






Stock # Number of Shares________ Price/Share Amount
SELL X
Total Amount of Stocks Sold
Plus Cash 
Buying Power







Total Amount of Stock Bought
Plus Cash
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Value of your Present Stocks After Transactions
Stock #_________ Number of Shares________ Price/Share Amount







Value of your Present Stocks






























Total Amount of Stocks Sold 
Plus Cash 
Buying Power










Total Amount of Stock Bought
Plus Cash
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Value of your Present Stocks After Transactions
Stock #_________ Number of Shares________ Price/Share Amount
X
X






Value of your Present Stocks 














Stock # Number of Shares Price/Share Amount
SELL
Total Amount of Stocks Sold
Plus Cash 
Buying Power







Total Amount of Stock Bought
Plus Cash
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Value of your Present Stocks After Transactions

















Value of your Present Stocks 












Stock # Number of Shares________ Price/Share Amount





Stock # Number of Shares Price/Share Amount
SELL
Total Amount of Stocks Sold
Plus Cash 
Buying Power






Total Amount of Stock Bought
Plus Cash
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Value of your Present Stocks After Transactions
Stock #_________ Number of Shares________ Price/Share Amount
X
X






Value of your Present Stocks 
Stock # Number of Shares________ Price/Share Amount
X











Stock # Number of Shares Price/Share Amount
SELL
X
Total Amount of Stocks Sold
Plus Cash 
Buying Power








Total Amount of Stock Bought
Plus Cash
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Value of your Present Stocks After Transactions
Stock #_________ Number of Shares________ Price/Share Amount
X
X






Value of your Present Stocks 


















Stock # Number of Shares Price/Share Amount
SELL
Total Amount of Stocks Sold
Plus Cash 
Buying Power
Stock # Number of Shares Price/Share Amount
BUY
X
Total Amount of Stock Bought
Plus Cash
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Value of your Present Stocks After Transactions
Stock #_________ Number of Shares________ Price/Share Amount
X






Final Value of your Stocks





Total Amount of Stock 
Plus Cash 
Final Total Net Worth
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Stock Market Sophistication Sheet
What does it mean to •'bny on margin?"
What does it mean to "sell short?"
What is a "warrant?"
What does "P:E ratio" mean?
What is the "Dow Jones Industrial Average?"
Do you own any stocks?
Have you ever talked to a broker with regards to buying or 
selling stocks?
Does your family own any stocks?
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Questionnaire
1. What is your age? _____________
2. What are the ages of your brothers and sisters?
3. Where is your home town? _______________________
*+. What is your Father's occupation? 
5- What is your Mother's occupation?





E) $20,001 and above


















#1 Kentucky Fried 
Chicken 5b.00 4-6.50 -13.9
#2 Xerox 114^88 105.25 - 8.^
#3 Dr Pepper 50.25 4-8.00 - ^.5
A S S Kresge 57.00 56.00 -  1 . 8
#5 Eagle Pitcher 30.38 27 .8 8 - 8.2
#6 Chase Manhattan Bank 53.25 51.25 - 3.9
#7 Macy R. H. 36.88 33.50 - 9.2
#8 Walker Hiram 43.88 4-8.63 +10.8
#9 Champion 30.13 22.63 -24-. 9
#10 Honeywell 152.50 14-5.00 - 4.9
#11 Amp ex 47.50 43.00 - 9.5
#12 Del Webb 16.75 10.75 -35.8
#13 Washington Water and Light 22.18 19.75 -11 .0
#1>+ Gulf Oil 32.25 28.00 -13.2
#15 Tenneco 25.63 22.25 - 1 3 . 2
#1 6 Columbia Gas System 26.75 25.25 - 5.6
